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n this paper I will focus on two
questions that people in general, and
philosophers in particular, generally
refuse to take seriously: Why is it
morally wrong to kill people for trivial
reasons (e.g., to barbecue them), and why is it
morally permissible to kill animals (Le., nonhuman animals) for trivial reasons? I will not
attempt to answer these questions; rather, my
interest is in why it is that so many people refuse
to take them seriously. I will argue that when it
comes to developing an "ethics of eating," the
stomach all too often triumphs over the mind.
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1. Two Modest Proposals

have insufficient protein in their diets. I
suggest that we remedy this situation - and
make a profit at the same time - by acquiring the bodies of people who died natural
deaths and selling the meat abroad. (We
might gain a "property right" to someone's
body by paying him today for the use of his
body when he dies.) I point out that it is
shamefully wasteful to dispose of corpses the
way we now do - namely, by contaminating
them with embalming fluid and then burying
them in the ground.
My students, on hearing this proposal, sometimes object that the meat of a dead person
would be unsafe to eat, inasmuch as it might be
contaminated with germs, the very germs that
killed the person in question. In reply to this
claim, I have three things to say. First, I point
out that we could be selective about which
corpses we sold; we could, for example, specialize in the relatively germ-free bodies of people
who had died of heart attacks. Second, even if
a corpse had some germs, most of these would
be killed by cooking the corpse. Third, even if
we sold corpses that could not be disinfected by
cooking, we still might be justified in selling
them: for the starving people in many parts of
the world, tainted meat is better than no food
at all.
Another common objection against passive
cannibalism is that practicing it will, in the
long run, tend to reduce our respect for our
fellow humans and will thereby make it more
likely that we will violate the rights of our
fellows.! In reply to this objection I point out
that there are documented cases in which
people have practiced passive cannibalism for
generations and have nevertheless maintained their respect for their fellow humans.2
And even if it were possible that the practice
of passive cannibalism would lessen our
respect for our fellow, isn't this potential evil

When I teach introductory ethics, I like to
befuddle my students by proposing a business
venture. I tell them that I have learned of the
existence of the Millionaire Gourmets' Club,
which is willing to spend vast sums of money
to obtain nice fat babies to roast. I suggest
that we try to profit from my discovery by
starting a baby-ranching business. What we
would do is find women who, for money, are
willing to become impregnated by paid sperm
donors. Both the women and the sperm
donors would be fully informed about our
plans. Any babies produced would be placed
on our baby ranch; there we would fatten
them, slaughter them ("slaughter" is such an
ugly word; perhaps we should instead say that
we would "harvest" them), and then sell the
carcasses (whoops, another ugly word) to the
Millionaire Gourmets' Club.
My students, needless to say, are shocked by
my proposal. They tell me that my babyranching venture would be nothing more
than an institutionalized form of murder.
They tell me that they would have no part in
such a venture - and they often add that the
whole idea is, to use their terminology, "gross
and disgusting."
What my students are objecting to is the
active cannibalism that my baby-ranching
plan would involve - active because the
people eaten are killed so that they can be
eaten. As it so happens, my students are also
opposed to passive cannibalism, which
involves, for example, eating people who
died natural deaths.
My students' aversion to passive cannibalism becomes apparent when I propose a
second business venture to them. I point out
that in many countries people are starving to
death and that in even more countries people
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outweighed by the actual evil that results
from our burying perfectly good meat and
thereby condemning distant peoples to death
by starvation?
My students are not alone in their aversion
to cannibalism. In our culture people in
general feel a strong enough aversion to have
made cannibalism a serious crime. In Ohio
(where I now reside) the law does not mention
cannibalism as such. One can nevertheless
draw the conclusion that active cannibalism is
illegal inasmuch as it involves murder, and one
suspects that passive cannibalism is also illegal,
inasmuch as it involves abuse of a corpse.
According to Ohio law, it is a fourth-degree
felony to "treat a human corpse in a way that
would outrage reasonable community sensibilities."3 Judging from my students' reaction,
people in my community do not look fondly
on acts of passive cannibalism.
When we tum our attention to other cultures, even "primitive" ones, we find that
they, too, are generally opposed to cannibalism in either of its forms. And even before the
spread of Christianity the practice of cannibalism was rare. 4 As taboos go, the cannibalism taboo would seem to put the incest taboo
to shame.
To be sure, the law and people in general
distinguish between what might be termed
recreational and non-recreational cannibalism. There is, many would claim, an important moral difference between eating a dead
person simply to have a novel culinary experience and eating a dead person to avoid starvation. Various members of the Donner party,
for example, resorted to non-recreational
passive cannibalism when confronted with
starvation; they were subsequently forgivenat least in the eyes of the law. It was only
when active cannibalism was suspected that
legal action was even threatened.5
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It is interesting to note, though, that even
though the public in some sense forgives acts
of non-recreational passive cannibalism, it
simultaneously finds these acts horrible. So
strong is our aversion to cannibalism - even
to non-recreational passive cannibalism that there have been many people who have
chosen to die rather than eat human flesh,
and many of those who have avoided death by
resorting to passive cannibalism have typically suffered greatly before doing so. They preferred to eat a shoe - or at least try to than eat human flesh.
Although people are generally opposed to
eating people, they rarely (in our culture, at
any rate) share the same qualms about eating
animals. To be sure, people have pronounced
likes and dislikes concerning animal flesh.
Although beef, pork, and chicken are popular
with Americans, relatively few of them will
eat frogs, rabbits, dogs, cats, or horses. Nevertheless, they tend not to make a moral issue
out of their dislikes. As far as I can tell, in
much of America you can eat anything you
want as long as it isn't a fellow human being.
There are laws against cruelty to animals, but
the law says surprisingly little about the uses
to which dead animals can be put.
By way of illustration, in Ohio there are
laws dealing with the consumption of "higher
animals" (e.g., dogs and horses) by people;
these laws, however, are intended not so
much to prevent these higher animals from
being consumed as to prevent people from
unwittingly being sold or served the flesh of a
higher animal when they think they are
eating, say, beef. Thus, the state of Ohio
requires any establishment serving horse meat
to post in a conspicuous place a sign, "which
shall be white and not less than twelve by
eighteen inches in size, upon which shall be
printed in plain black Roman letters, ...
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'Horse Meat Served Here'" 6 In Ohio it isn't a
crime to sell horse meat or to eat it; the crime
is in passing off horse meat as some other kind
of animal flesh.

explain (even to someone as apparently dense
as their instructor) the difference between
cows and people - Le., the difference that
allows us to say that cattle ranching is morally
permissible but that baby ranching is not.
Here are some of the explanations they typically offer, together with the reason why these
explanations are unacceptable.

2. Cows and People
It is fairly clear, then, that in America and
. in much of the world a human corpse is more
of a sacred thing than is a living cow: to
defile a corpse - which of course is incapable of suffering - is a far greater crime
than is causing a cow significant discomfort
and suffering simply so that one can enjoy a
Big Mac. 7
This raises an important question: is there
really that much difference between people
and cows that you can kill and eat cows and
(most Americans would claim) raise no
important moral issues, but that you can't eat
people (even ones who have died natural
deaths) without committing acts of moral
depravity?
We have now reached the heart of the
issue: are there important (Le., morally significant) differences between cows and
people? And if so, what are they? Unless we
are able to point out· such differences, then it
would seem that we are inconsistent when
we hold - as people typically do - that it is
morally permissible to eat cows but not
people. If we wish to be consistent, we would
have to hold either (i) that both eating cows
and eating people are morally permissible or
(ii) that neither eating cows nor eating people
is morally permissible. If we choose the
second alternative, we end up - if we are
moral people, at any rate - as vegetarians,
and if we choose the first alternative, we
must drop our objections to cannibalism,
passive or otherwise.
My students feel confident that they can

Between the Species

(1) Caws don't mind being killed - or at any
rate, they don't protest when we kill them. This
answer won't do, though, since the babies
involved in my baby-ranching scheme are
unlikely to protest when we kill them. Consequently, this "difference" isn't a difference
at all.
(2) We kill cows in a painless way. One
wonders whether this is true, but even it if
were, it won't do as an answer. Notice after
all, that the babies in my baby-ranching
scheme will be killed in a painless way. So
again, the alleged difference is not really a
difference.

I

t is fairly clear, then, that
in America and in much of
the world a human corpse is
more of a sacred thing than is a
living cow: to defile a corpse is
a far greater crime than is
causing a cow significant dis..
comfort and suffering simply so
that one can enjoy a Big Mac.

(3) We raise the cows just so we can eat them,
and since we bring the cows inw existence, we
have the right w end their lives as we see fit.
Again, this answer won't do sirwe in my baby14
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biles, build bridges, paint pictures, program
computers, and write philosophy papers.
The problem with this line of response is
that it just pushes our inquiry back one step.
Now we must ask why the abilities just
described are so important - and in what
sense they are important.
If it be answered, as it often will, that
these abilities are important because they
enable us to advance our interests (life is
easier if you can drive across a bridge instead
of having to swim across a river), the narcissism of our value system becomes apparent:
to sayan action is good is to say it is good for
people. s It also becomes apparent how convenient this line of response is for us as a
species.
A cynic might, at this point, suggest that
what we have done in selecting the capacity
for rational thought as the thing that distinguishes us from the other animals is to
demonstrate our superiority over the other
animals by choosing an ability that we have
and they lack and by saying that this ability is
the one that matters. Why are we so great?
Because we are like we are. Why are the
other animals morally insignificant? Because
they are unlike us.
There are, to be sure, other ways to answer
the questions, "Why is rational thought so
important?" I will not take time to describe
these answers; I will, however, point out that
any such answer must not only presuppose a
value system but presumably a value system
that is "biased" in favor of the interests of
human beings. Before one can point to a difference between cows and people as being
ethically significant, one must already have
ethical values. For this reason, our attempt
to point out the ethically significant difference between people and cows raises more
questions than it answers.

ranching scheme we are bringing the babies
into existence that we eventually "harvest."
We "made" these babies; few would go on to
infer, however, that this gives us the right to
kill and eat them.
(4) People have souls; cows don't. The basic
problem with this response is that souls are
not observable, so the claim made does not
appear to be one that we can test empirically.
And although one can accept the above
claim as a "leap of faith," it is a leap that
many people are unwilling to take.
(5) People have a right to life; cows don't.
This is a terrific response but for one thing:
it begs the question. What I am asking, after
all, is this: what difference is there between
people and cows that gives people but not
cows a right to life? The answer to my questions cannot be that people have a right to
life but cows don't.
(6) People are capable of rational thought;
cows are not. This answer, by the way, is the
one that many philosophers (including, I
think, Kant) will give.
I agree that people do have a greater
capacity for rational thought than cows.
(What I mean to say, of course, is that most
people have a greater capacity for rational
thought than most cows.) The problem is
that I don't agree that this difference is an
impcrrtant difference - or at least not one
important enough to account for the disparity between our views on the moral acceptability of eating people and our views on the
moral acceptability of eating cows.
Why is capacity for rational thought such
an important thing? One answer that is commonly given to this question is that capacity
for rational thought is valuable and important because it lets us do valuable and important things. What things? Well, things
animals can't do, like manufacture automo-
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I, for one, suspect that the differences
between people and cows are not that great
- and certainly not great enough to justify
the disparity between our moral views concerning people and our moral views concerning cows. Unless we assume that people are
terrific and cows aren't, I doubt that we will
ever be able to prove as much.

burying it. If we value the lives of people and
animals, shouldn't we in these cases advocate
the consumption of animal flesh?
Indeed, I know of one author who argues
that we are guilty of waste when we bury the
millions of dogs and cats we annually destroy.9
This author would, of course, prefer that we
not destroy these animals, but once we have
destroyed them, does it make sense to dispose
of their meat as if it were so much garbage?
In short, the hard-core vegetarian who
declares that it is never morally permissible to
consume animal flesh might be guilty of
inconsistency. Of course, few vegetarians are
"hard core" in the sense intended.
If what I have said in this paper is correct,
many people have an inconsistent "ethics of
eating." Why the inconsistency? Because, I
think, they have allowed their stomachs to
triumph over their minds. Our food prejudices are so strong that we will typically
reject any ethical system that disagrees with
them - even though doing so means falling
into inconsistency.
Although they would typically be reluctant to admit it, many grown-up philosophers have a hard time reasoning their way
around their upbringing. Someone raised on
Big Macs might, on obtaining his philosophy
Ph.D., find it easy to prove that cows lack a
right to life. At the same time, though, one
can imagine that if his culture had been different - if, for example, this philosopher
had been raised to think of cows as sacred he would, as an adult, be able to invent any
number of arguments to show that both cows
and people have rights. Similarly, if human
physiology required us to engage periodically
in cannibalistic acts to remain healthy, our
ethicists would probably come up with persuasive arguments in favor of cannibalism.
Am I suggesting, then, that much of moral

3. Concluding Remarks
Some might, at this point, wonder whether
the above remarks constitute an ethical argument for vegetarianism - or at least show
that the ethical beliefs of the vegetarian are
more consistent than those of the non-vegetarian. I wish they did, but I fear they do not.
Notice, once again, that from the view that
there are no important differences between
people and cows, it does not follow that vegetarianism is morally obligatory. What does
follow, as was mentioned above, is one of two
things: either vegetarianism is morally obligatory, ar cannibalism is morally permissible. It
will take funher argument to establish one of
these disjuncts as the correct view.
Another thing to realize is that in the
same way as a non-vegetarian might be guilty
of inconsistency when she refuses to engage
in cannibalism (passive or otherwise), a vegetarian might also be guilty of inconsistency
when she refuses to eat the meat of an
animal who lived a "natural life" and died a
"natural death."
Suppose, then, that some animal has lived a
natural life and died a natural death. As a
result we find ourselves with a body to dispose
of. We can eat it, or we can feed it to carnivorous animals, or we can bury it. What I want
to suggest is that in a world with starving
people - and starving animals, for that matter
- it makes little sense to waste this food by
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philosophy is little more than an attempt to
"rationalize" our moral intuitions? Indeed I
am. I strongly suspect that our ethical "gut
feelings" - about murder, about cannibalism,
about the value of human life in generalare the "data" against which we test ethical
theories. When an ethical theory doesn't
properly "account for" our favored set of
ethical data (Le., our ethical "gut feelings"),
we reject the theory. It can also happen that
we discard ethical data in light of an ethical
theory, but this is much less common.
I suspect that some of my readers have
found this a disgusting paper, a paper not to
read before mealtime. I apologize for this, but
at the same time I urge my readers to examine
their feelings of disgust and to ask whether
these feelings have had any significant'influence on their ethical views. And to those of
you who have been led to vegetarianism by
ethical arguments, let me offer a piece of
advice: your real job is not so much to persuade the minds of carnivores as to persuade
their stomachs. Where their stomachs go,
their minds will surely follow.

1 Kant and Aquinas, for example, take this line.
For more on this point see Tom Regan's "Ethical
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pp.287-93.
6 Ohio Revised Code, sec. 919.07.
7 A related claim can be made about medical experimentation. Recently there was a public rutery concerning medical experimentation on brain-dead human
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humans than aboot living animals.
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